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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DE FACTO SCHOOL SEGREGATION
Present day attempts to desegregate the schools received their
impetus from the decision of the United States Supreme Court that
"separate but equal" facilities are not tolerable under the Con-
stitution.' Since this 1954 decision the courts have been the primary
medium used to enforce that mandate. Cases on racial discrimina-
tion have been very numerous in the period since Brown,2 and
one can scarcely look at a volume of the reporter system of our
federal courts without finding that it contains at least one case on
some form of alleged racial injustice.
Perhaps the most litigated problem in the area of discrimination
is that of school segregation, and within the last two or three years
it appears that a new target has been selected from within the
school problem. This is the situation that is referred to as de
facto segregation. De facto segregation is defined as existing when
minority groups are separated from large parts of the white popula-
tion on a basis other than race.8 De facto segregation is thus
more properly described as racial imbalance than segregation, as
under the above mentioned definition it can occur only when its
basis is not racial considerations and does not usually involve total
separation of the races.
This type of "segregation" occurs as a by-product of the neigh-
borhood school policy, which is widely used throughout the United
States. 4 The racial minorities have tried to break up the im-
balance in the school that their children attend by asking the courts
for mandatory injunctions prohibiting the school boards from con-
tinuing to operate the school system in a segregated manner. The
courts have acted on these requests inconsistently, which is not
surprising in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has not
seen fit to give a clear mandate on this problem. It is the purpose
of this note to examine the cases considering de facto segregation
in the light of the opinion in Brown,5 the fourteenth amendment6
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2. Ibid.
3. See 50 VA. L. REv. 464, 465 & n. 3 (1964).4. See Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), aff'd
324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
5. Supra note 1.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
NOTES
and the opinions of the Supreme Court in other applicable situations
to determine, as far as is possible, how the Supreme Court will
handle this problem when it is presented.
The culprit in a de facto segregation situation is usually the
neighborhood school policy. This policy operates by using school
attendance zones, which are drawn by the school board around
each school in its system. Every school child in each zone is
required to attend the school within his "neighborhood," and trans-
fers out of these areas are prohibited. The advantages of this
system are apparent. It allows the board to anticipate the enroll-
ment at each school several years in advance, and new construction
needs, teacher placement, materiel distribution and budget require-
ments can be made with the expectation that the situation planned
for will actually exist when that period arrives.
Since the minority groups tend to reside in the same area
within the city, the schools in these areas tend to have student
bodies that are racially imbalanced. In the de facto cases, the
parents of these students have asked the courts to issue injunctions
prohibiting the school boards from continuing to adhere to the
neighborhood school plan, alleging that the board has intentionally
created a segregated school. Furthermore, they suggest that if
the board has not intentionally acted to achieve racial segregation,
the fact that the school is "segregated in fact" brings the plan
under the mandate in Brown7 since such does not afford the equal
protection that the Constitution s requires.
There is no doubt that a school board is prohibited, since the
ruling in Brown, 9 from intentionally zoning a school for the purpose
of segregating the races, and the courts have so held.10 The answer
is not so clear where the board has acted in good faith in drawing
the lines, and, as previously mentioned, the results are not as
uniform. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the issue
of segregation and discrimination is so charged with emotion.
Furthermore, our judges are necessarily members of the human
family, with the same feelings as other mortals. Since the problem
of de facto segregation seems to have been litigated with increasing
frequency, in the last two years, it would seem that the Supreme
Court should consider the issue soon, and bring order to the field
before too much inconsistency results from the lower court decisions.
There are ten cases which have directly considered the question
of de facto segregation, and there are many more which have
language which may be applicable to that problem and which are
7. Supra note 1.
8. Supra note 6.
9. Supra note 1.
10. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940(1961); Jeffers v. Whitley, 809 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962).
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cited as authoritative, but the holdings in these cases covered other
issues, and the applicable language is only dicta. This dicta cannot
be ignored, however, since it is an excellent indication of how
that court will decide the issue when it accepts a hearing on the
problem.
Those courts that hold that there is nothing in the neighborhood
school policy that violates the Constitution, when exercised in good
faith, base their decisions on five reasons.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment is prohibitory and not compelling.
Those courts that hold the neighborhood school policy to be
valid for this reason,"" rely on the words of the amendment. They
emphasize the fact that its wording is: "nor shall any state deny any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws,' 1 2 and contend
that this does not authorize the courts to compel the states to act,
but only prohibits action. If, however, the states are truly guilty
of a denial of equal protection there can be no argument about
the power of the court to prohibit continuance of this treatment,
and to order action taken to correct the unconstitutional condition
that has resulted. If this were not true, the fourteenth amendment
would be unenforceable, and the court would have been acting
without authority when it ordered the end to segregation by law
in Topeka, Kansas.'8
This then leads to a question that none of the courts have
considered in their opinions. That is: is an unequal education the
equivalent of unequal protection which is prohibited by the four-
teenth amendment? The obvious way to determine the answer to
this question would be to consider each case on its merits, and
make a determination as to whether a child of any other race
would be allowed to transfer on the grounds that he was receiving
an unsatisfactory education. If the answer is no, there is no unequal
protection of the laws, and if the answer is yes, there is definitely
unequal treatment. Any other holding would fly in the face of
the principle that the constitution is color-blind, and would only
be a reverse application of unequal treatment.
2. The Constitution is color-blind.
Applied to de facto segregation by one court,' 4 the theory that
the Constitution is color-blind has been used by the Supreme Court
in considering the makeup of juries. The Supreme Court has held
that a negro has no right to have persons of his race placed on
a jury, 15 and it has been held that it is just as unconstitutional
11. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct.
898 (1965); Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., supra note 4; Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F.
Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962).
12. Supra note 6.
13. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Lynch v. Kenston School Dist., 229 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
15. Hernandez v. TexaS, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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to intentionally place negroes on a jury to ensure a racial balance
as to intentionally exclude them from a jury. 16 This principle
cannot be carried to an extreme, for then the courts might con-
ceivably be precluded from noting the fact that a litigant is a
negro when determining his rights, which would lead to very unjust
results. It seems that it should be applicable to the degree that
it prevents the occurrence of enforced "reverse" segregation, for
to put it simply, the equal protection guarantees should operate
with equal force in all directions.
3. Segregation that is not willful does not contravene the Four-
teenth Amendment.
It is often said in these cases that discrimination that is not
intentional does not violate any constitutional provision." This
statement has some precedent in decisions of the Supreme Court
and has been used in cases concerning equal protection under state
taxing statutes 8 and in the application of election laws. 19 There
appears to be no reason why this should be of any less force
in a case involving school segregation, if the problem is taken away
from the emotion that generally surrounds it.
4. The decision in Brown20 is limited to intentional segregation.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Brown21 was concerned
only with enforced segregation and the "separate but equal" prin-
ciple. Care must be taken so that the language of that case is
not applied too broadly, for Brown22 can easily be distinguished
from the de facto situation on its facts alone. In that decision
the Court said that they were proscribing segregation based solely
on race.2 3 They were considering nothing more. The lower courts
have at times used the emphasis given above as holding that the
Court was indicating that other segregation was allowable under
that decision.24 Those courts have also used the questions pro-
pounded to counsel for reargument in Brown25 to bolster this claim.
Question 4 (a) read:
Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools
violates the Fourteenth Amendment (a) would a decree
necessarily follow providing that, within the limits by normal
16. Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964).
17. Craggett v. Board of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1964) ; Lynch v. Kenston
School Dist., supra note 14; Webb v. Board of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963)
Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
18. See Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918).
19. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
20. Supra note 13.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 494.
24. Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), aff'd 324 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) ; Lynch v. Kenston School Dist.,
supra note 14; Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962).
25. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n. 13 (1954).
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geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith
be admitted to schools of their choice ..... (emphasis
supplied).
This, it is argued,26 clearly shows that the Supreme Court considers
neighborhood school attendance zones to be proper. But might it
not also indicate that the Court i n t e n d e d to limit its order to de-
segregate to a reasonable plan? Until it speaks clearly on the
subject we cannot know, but this must weigh heavily in determining
that a plan must include balancing of the races.
5. The benefits of integration are outweighed by the dangers and
inconveniences of the system which would result if the neigh-
borhood plan is abandoned.
One court has said that it was influenced by the "reasonable-
ness" of the procedure necessary to eliminate de facto segregation, '2 7
but others have given no indication that this entered into their
considerations at all. It seems that all of the courts that must
decide whether or not to order a new school attendance plan must
necessarily consider the economics of the proposed plan. To ignore
the financial impact that the new plan might have on the system
would possibly result in a community being blessed with a school
system that is completely balanced as to race, but so far in debt
that the standard of education in all schools is lower than that
of the most inferior under the old imbalanced system.
These are the reasons given for refusing to discard the neighbor-
hood school plan. The reasons given for the converse decision
are self explanatory. Those courts 28 feel that the decision in
Brown29 must be read to prohibit all segregated education, no
matter what its cause may be, because it is "inherently unequal."
It is stated30 that the main constitutional question is the fact that
the school is segregated, and that the reason for this is the zones
created by the board. This board action constitutes an act of the
state, and the opportunities are unequal, ergo, it is unconstitutional.
This reasoning conflicts with the theory, that was advanced earlier
when discussing the fourteenth amendment, that unequal educa-
tional opportunities, without more, may not be unequal protection of
the laws. Also, when discussing the effects of segregated education
in Brown,31 the Supreme Court was discussing a situation where
there was total separation of the races.
No court has discussed the possibility that de facto segregation,
26. Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., supra note 24.
27. Evans v. Buchanan, supra note 24.
28. Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 33 L.W. 2356 (D. Mass. 1965); Blocker
v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ., 204
F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
29. Supra note 25.
30. Branche v. Board of Educ., eupra note 28.
31. Bupra note 25.
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where it is not total separation, may not be held to have that
same effect on the children, at least not with the certainty that
is evidenced in Brown. 2 In fact, only one court has stated a
definite rule as to what degree of racial imbalance it considered
to be equal to segregation. 8 This case set the entire issue in clear
perspective, and since it is currently in the process of appeal, it
will give the Supreme Court an excellent vehicle to make its views
clearly known. In this case Judge Sweeney found that the board
had not intentionally zoned the city to create a segregated school
system, and he also found that any school that had a student body
that is composed of more than fifty per cent negro students is
segregated. He then held that the board must submit a plan to
desegregate the system, and stayed his order pending appeal."4 The
issue here is clearly defined, and it would be hard to hand fashion
a case that would give the Supreme Court a better opportunity to
clear the confusion.
When the Supreme Court finally agrees to hear a de facto
segregation case, what will it decide? There are those who contend 8
that the Court has made its views known by denying certiorari
in two of the cases86 that held that there was no constitutional
violation by a good faith application of the neighborhood school
policy. Such an action by the Court does not signify that that body
approves or disapproves of the opinion that it is asked to review.
According to Justice Frankfurter, 7 the denial of certiorari merely
signifies that a majority of the justices do not feel that the Court
should consider the issue at that time. Therefore, this method of
"guess-timating" the answer of the Supreme Court may not produce
a reliable answer. It might be of value to count the number of
lower courts on each side, if only to see which is in the majority.
Only two federal courts have held that the de facto segregated
school violates the Constitution,8 and they are both district courts.
One state supreme court has also indicated that it feels this way.89
On the other hand, there are two circuit courts of appeals40 and
four district courts41 that have decided contra. In addition, two
32. Ibid.
33. Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., supra note 28.
34. Supplemental order, Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., filed U.S. District
Court, D. Mass., Jan. 19, 1965.
35. See Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 1965, p. 14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 2,
1965, p. 1, col. 6; Time, Feb. 5, 1965, p. 70, col. 1.
36. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct.
898 (1965) ; Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), aff'd
324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
37. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 91; (1950).
38. Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. N.Y. 1964) and Branche v.
Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. N.Y. 1962) ; Barksdale v. Springfield School
Comm., 33 L.W. 2356 (D. Mass. 1965).
39. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 31 Cal Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878 (1963).
40. Downs v. Board of Educ., supra note 36; Bell v. School City of Gary, Ind., supra
note 36.
41. Lynch v. Kenston School Dist, 229 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Craggett v.
Board of Educ., 234 F. SuOP. 381 (N.D. Ohio 1964) ; 1vans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820(D. Del. 1962); Webb v. Board of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Henry v.
Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
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circuit courts have clearly indicated that they accept this view,' 2
as do a large number of district courts.43 The box score of followers
of each holding is weighted heavily in favor of the constitutionality
of the neighborhood school plan.
The fact that this interpretation of the law seems to be more
generally accepted is in line with the authors opinion that it is
based on the better reasoning. The reason that it is felt that this
view should be accepted is based largely on the reasoning that
the fourteenth amendment applies equally in all directions, and
that reverse discrimination ought to be as abhorrent to the Con-
stitution as any other.
ALAN GRINDBERG
42. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964);
Bradley v. School Bd., 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963).
43. See Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 221 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Tenn. 1963); Calhoun
V. Members of Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1959); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955); Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. S.C.
1955).
